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Abstract 
The Potential Role of E-Commerce in Florida’s Cattle Market: Theory 
and Application 
 
The economic theories of New Institutional Economics (NIE), auctions, and 
welfare economics are used to analyze the potential for E-Commerce as an institution 
within the agricultural sector. We discuss the theory of the firm within the NIE paradigm 
and focus on the potential for E-Commerce to reduce transaction costs, search costs, and 
the costs associated with buying and selling livestock under various auction formats.  We 
develop a theoretical model that captures the effect of Internet feeder-cattle auctions on 
Florida’s cattle market at three different levels in the marketing channel.  We discuss the 
institutional arrangements and marketing mechanisms associated with the marketing of 
stocker and feeder cattle in Florida.  We present the results of a survey distributed to 
cattle producers in North Florida regarding herd size, direct transaction costs of 
marketing cattle, and the implications of internet technology.  Finally, we perform an 
empirical welfare analysis in order to estimate the impact of reduced transaction costs 
associated with Internet and video livestock auctions on cow-calf operators and 
backgrounders in Florida. 
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The Potential Role of E-Commerce in Florida’s Cattle Market: Theory 
and Application 
I. Introduction 
E-Commerce emerged on the business scene during the 1990s. At that time, E-
commerce technologies and the ensuing flurry of companies marketing both to 
consumers and to other businesses were hailed as being on the cutting edge of a new 
epoch of business—The New Economy. This New Economy, dependent on Information 
Technology (IT), promised flexible business structures more capable of responding to 
ever-changing consumer preferences when compared to traditional “bricks and mortar” 
companies. At the dawn of the new millennium, the growth of many Internet companies 
slumped (and in some cases reversed) as questions regarding the market potential for 
Internet business ventures arose. Since late 2000, E-Commerce companies have 
encountered even more financial difficulties: 
As these young companies have burned through their venture capital 
funding they have been forced to lay off employees, shutter their sites or 
file for bankruptcy protection (in some cases all three)…Dot-coms 
announced a record 8,789 job cuts in November [2000], a 55 percent 
increase over October’s [2000] record total of 5,677 layoffs. (Konrad, 
2000) 
According to another source: 
The bursting of the dot-com bubble cost venture-capital funds, and the 
public-market investors that followed them, as much as $100 billion in 
losses last year [2000] . . . “What will they [venture capitalists] be 
investing in? … Internet-services companies, and particularly online 
retailers likely won’t find funding anywhere, except from venture funds 
trying to breathe new life into existing holdings.” (McGee, 2001). 
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The rapid fluctuation in the number of Internet companies, especially Internet retailers, 
begs the question: Is there any substance to the New Economy, or is E-Commerce just a 
passing fad? 
The role E-Commerce plays within the marketing of domestic agricultural 
products raises further issues. With prices decreasing steadily for several agricultural 
commodities, the possibility of including value-added agriculture or identity-preserved 
(IP) agriculture in E-Commerce is a viable alternative for some producers. E-Commerce 
can minimize the cost of establishing new marketing channels by using Internet IP rather 
than using traditional marketing channels, such as local auctions or posted prices. 
Alternatively, E-Commerce allows producers within traditional marketing channels to 
gain the benefits of IP at lower costs by coordinating shipping or storage costs. 
Several sectors, including agriculture and agribusiness, have been experimenting 
with transactions among different entities via the Internet since 1995 (I-Commerce).  
These transactions take place in the form of either business-to-consumer (B2C) or 
business-to-business (B2B).  An agricultural example of I-Commerce related B2C 
marketing is the selling of fresh fruits and vegetables over the Internet (Table 1). 
Agricultural examples of I-Commerce related B2B marketing include livestock auctions 
and farm equipment auctions held over the Internet (Table 2).  Furthermore, the livestock 
sales network directory (www.lssnet.com) currently lists over 1400 livestock sellers in 
the United States that can be contacted via e-mail by perspective buyers. 
Gains from E-Commerce accrue for three main reasons: (1) reduced transaction 
costs, (2) increased participation in auctions, and (3) coordination of contracting through 
supply-chain management. Each of these possibilities can be addressed using the New 
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Institutional Economics (NIE) paradigm, which focuses on the nature and content of 
institutions, transaction costs, and diseconomies of scope. This framework yields a 
variety of institutional interactions including vertical integration, contracting, markets, 
and joint ventures into which E-Commerce fits. Information technology, including the 
Internet and Email as components of E-Commerce, may be used to reduce transaction 
costs and may lead to new ways to coordinate existing market transactions. In addition, 
IT may reduce monitoring costs and diseconomies of scope. 
In this paper, we draw upon the economic theories of NIE, auctions, and welfare 
economics to analyze the potential for E-Commerce as an institution within the 
agricultural sector. We discuss the theory of the firm within the NIE paradigm and focus 
on the potential for E-Commerce to reduce transaction costs, search costs, and the costs 
associated with buying and selling livestock under various auction formats.  We develop 
a theoretical model that captures the effect of Internet feeder-cattle auctions on Florida’s 
cattle market at three different levels in the marketing channel.  We then discuss the 
institutional arrangements associated with the marketing of stocker and feeder cattle in 
Florida.  We also describe the four major mechanisms for marketing cattle: (1) local 
livestock auctions; (2) video auctions; (3) internet auctions; (4) private contracts/country 
sales.  We then present detailed information collected from the results of a survey 
distributed to cattle producers in North Florida regarding herd size, direct transaction 
costs of marketing cattle, and the implications of internet technology.  Finally, we 
perform an empirical welfare analysis in order to estimate the impact of reduced 
transaction costs associated with Internet and video livestock auctions on cow-calf 
operators and backgrounders in Florida.  
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II. Theory of the Firm 
Coase (1937) initially investigated the nature and theory of the firm and the 
various factors that determine its boundaries.  Coase originally questioned why two firms 
exist in business and not one or three?  The neoclassical approach to economics focuses 
primarily on the productive efficiency of the firm, and it has relatively little to say about 
the organization of production. In Coase’s theory, the boundaries of the firm are 
determined by comparing the diseconomies of scope to transaction costs. If transaction 
costs are greater than diseconomies of scope, production will be vertically integrated. But 
if diseconomies of scope are greater than transaction costs, a market for intermediate 
products will exist. Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985), and Grossman and Hart (1986) have 
extended Coase’s theory of the firm by further defining the nature of transaction costs 
and by introducing analysis of contracts. 
The term “transaction costs” can be associated with the direct and indirect costs 
involved when buying and selling agricultural output. These transaction costs may 
include direct costs, such as yardage in the case of livestock, or quality testing in the case 
of cotton. In the case of the stocker-cattle market, farmers may wish to compare the gains 
of marketing cattle in a local auction house to the gains of marketing cattle in a larger 
regional market.  In this case, transportation could play a significant role in the decision.  
However, the marketing of cattle in a larger regional market may allow producers to 
capture indirect opportunity costs. Specifically, as developed by the Williamson 
literature, transaction costs may include opportunity costs, due to market power, that are 
borne by farmers. 
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Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985) develops three characteristics that affect 
transaction costs within a market: (1) asset specificity, (2) uncertainty, and (3) frequency 
of transaction. Based on these characteristics, Williamson conjectures that different 
combinations of these factors can result in different types of market structures or in 
vertical integration. According to Williamson, asset specificity is the cornerstone of the 
transaction-costs view of economics. Asset specificity states that the productive assets of 
a firm are tied to the production of a specific good, or group of goods, whose demand is 
dominated by a single firm or by a small group of firms. While it is tempting to frame 
asset specificity within a monopsony model with imperfect competition, monopsony 
power alone is insufficient to generate increased transaction costs. 
The most common example of asset specificity involves the manufacture of 
automotive body panels (Grossman and Hart, 1986). In this example, two firms are 
involved in the manufacture of automobiles. One firm specializes in the manufacture of 
body panels while the other assembles the body panels along with other inputs to create 
the car. Asset specificity occurs when the firm making the body panels must buy a mold 
that is specific to a particular type of car. Once the mold is purchased, the panelmaker’s 
investment becomes tied to that car manufacturer. The automobile manufacturer can then 
extract rents from the panelmaker.  The impact of asset specificity on transactions 
between the automobile manufacturer and the panelmaker is referred to as a hold-up 
problem.  Given this relationship, the manufacturer can extract rents from the panelmaker 
by underreporting the actual demand for panels. 
Undoubtedly, agricultural asset specificity is less clear-cut than that observed in 
the automobile example. However, some agricultural investments imply significant 
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specificity. Moss and Schmitz (1999) examine the asset specificity associated with 
investments in sugarcane production.  In the case of sugarcane production, however, the 
hold-up problem is two-sided. In Florida, sugarcane producers are dependent on sugar 
mills.  Because of the relatively small number of sugarcane producers, sugar mills can be 
“held up” by producers.  As a result, the sugarcane sector in Florida is highly integrated. 
True hold-up problems in agriculture are the exception rather than the rule. Most 
commodities, such as wheat, are relatively easy to store and transport. From this 
perspective, E-Commerce may reduce asset specificity by expanding the geographic 
region of the market. For example, E-Commerce may be used to expand the potential 
buyers for stocker cattle beyond the area served by local auction houses, thereby reducing 
the potential hold-up problem in local markets.  However, small numbers of buyers alone 
do not necessarily imply a hold-up problem. 
Uncertainty is the second factor that influences transaction costs. Here uncertainty 
refers to difficulty in assessing quality as well as to other factors that affect price 
distribution. Some local cattle auctions are dominated by a relatively small number of 
buyers. In Florida, for example, a relatively small number of buyers purchase cattle at 
each auction house. In such cases, sellers may find it difficult to separate quality 
discounts from tacit, or explicit, collusion among buyers. Price signals for cattle buyers 
may be further confused by random fluctuations in market-level cattle prices. Thus, if the 
seller gets a lower price one week relative to the previous week, it is difficult to 
determine whether the price decline is attributable to a quality discount, to the market 
power of the buyers, or to changes in the overall price of cattle. 
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The frequency of transactions is the third factor that affects transaction costs. 
Farmers have access to more information on commodities that are traded more 
frequently. In the previous example of cattle auctions, the average price of cattle received 
in the current week can be compared to the average price of cattle received in the 
previous week. Thus, information on the overall trend in the price of cattle can be 
observed. Further, if similar auctions for cattle exist in the area, the average price of cattle 
in one market can be compared with the average price of cattle in another market to infer 
information about relative market power and differences in quality. Consider the 
comparison of average cattle prices in large, regional auctions (e.g., Amarillo, Texas and 
Dodge City, Kansas) to local auction cattle prices. Assuming that a larger number of 
buyers in regional auctions reduces the cost of asset specificity and quality uncertainty, 
the price difference between local auctions and regional auctions should be 
approximately equal to the transportation costs and other services provided by cattle 
buyers such as aggregation for more efficient pen sizes.  E-Commerce has the potential to 
increase the frequency of transactions beyond that observed in regional markets. 
Benefits to agriculture from E-Commerce can be modeled using the transaction-
cost literature. According to this literature, transaction costs are functions of asset 
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of transactions. Studies of transaction costs within 
this framework have been conducted using comparative economics. Specifically, 
researchers focus on the differences in characteristics among commodities to infer 
differences in transaction costs. In the case of cattle markets, comparisons among 
different herd sizes and locations may be used to derive differences in transaction costs 
and gains from E-Commerce. 
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III. Impact of Information Technology on Transaction Costs 
Some commodities, such as stocker and feeder cattle, are sold in oral auctions. In 
the United States these auctions are typically English auctions in which the price begins 
with a low bid and goes to a higher bid as opposed to Dutch auctions in which the price 
begins with a high bid and goes to a lower bid. These auctions can be contrasted with the 
marketing mechanism for commodities, such as wheat, which are sold at local elevators 
using fixed prices. Other agricultural marketing mechanisms include grade and yield, 
forward contracts, and pool (or participation) contracts. 
While we have presented a view of transaction costs from the seller’s perspective, 
significant transaction costs may also be borne by consumers. This is especially true in 
the area of search costs. One of the key assumptions in the derivation of the efficiency of 
competitive markets is the existence of perfect information. Most discussions of the 
violation of perfect information involve the impact of randomness across time. The 
theoretical response to this form of randomness is the assumption of rational expectations 
(Muth 1961). However, the rational expectations approach still assumes that a single 
price will clear the market once the random outcome is revealed.  Moreover, the 
competitive markets hypothesis assumes that the price for one good at a certain time is 
equal across all locations.  However, the existence of imperfect information typically 
results in a situation in which two consumers pay different prices for the same good. 
Thus, one of the consumers must have paid a higher price than was necessary, which is 
inconsistent with efficient markets. 
One approach to resolving this ambiguity is to hypothesize positive search costs. 
Salop and Stiglitz (1982) develop a model in which different firms can set different prices 
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for their output. In the Salop and Stiglitz model, these differences in price are sustained 
by positive search costs. Further, certain firms within this formulation exploit this price 
dispersion, maintaining prices above the competitive equilibrium. In the model, three 
different equilibria are possible. The first equilibrium is a random dispersion of prices. In 
this equilibrium, positive search costs imply differences in price, but firms are not able to 
systematically capture economic rents through differential pricing. The second 
equilibrium is a single price above the competitive price. In this equilibrium, producers 
are able to collude to capture economic rents from search costs. The third equilibrium is 
actually a disequilibrium, in which certain retailers are able to offer quantity discounts. 
Thus, some firms are able to cheat systematically in the game-theoretic formulation. 
For our purposes, the second equilibrium is relevant. Specifically, in this 
equilibrium, merchants use positive search costs to extract rents from consumers. The 
implication is that reducing search costs reduces economic rents extracted by the 
merchant. Further, since this rent is actually a transaction cost (in Williamson’s sense), a 
reduction in the search cost associated with consumers can result in an increase in profits 
at the farm level. IT innovations may actually reduce the search costs involved when 
consumers deal directly with producers. Thus, IT could result in the complete elimination 
of one level from the marketing channel. As an example, the B2C sites that sell fresh fruit 
(Table 1) may eventually lead to the elimination of packers who ship to consumers. 
Milgrom (1989) presents an overview of auctions and bidding. He traces the 
theoretical development of auction theory to the work of Vickrey (1961). This early work 
develops the conditions under which an auction yields an equilibrium for willingness to 
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pay, and it contrasts several alternative forms of auction mechanisms. Most of this 
literature suggests that each auction yields similar final prices. 
Another facet of auction theory is the “winner’s curse.” The winner’s curse grows 
out of the assumption that each potential buyer’s bid is based on a Bayesian probability-
density function. In this scenario, the agent with the winning bid may be the one that 
possesses the least information regarding the value of the contract. Specifically, “Even 
though each contractor’s individual bid is unbiased (i.e. equal on average to the expected 
cost), the lowest bid is biased downward” (Milgrom 1989: 5). 
In general, the literature on auction theory suggests that the final price paid for an 
item at an auction is a function of the number of buyers. This result, like the winner’s 
curse, is a result of modeling the price a buyer is willing to pay using Bayesian 
probability-density functions. If we assume that each agent’s assessment of quality is an 
outcome from a Bayesian probability-density function, then the larger the number of bids, 
the more likely it is that a higher bid will occur. 
The implications of auction theory for I-Commerce applications to agriculture 
may be more significant for B2B arrangements. Specifically, one application of I-
Commerce to B2B marketing in agricultural to date is the existence of Internet cattle 
auctions. The implications of I-Commerce for cattle auctions are twofold: first, E-
Commerce reduces the transaction costs that may arise from market power in smaller, 
local markets; and second, auction theory suggests that I-Commerce can expand the 
number of potential buyers, potentially leading to a higher price. 
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IV. Marketing Channels 
Few agricultural products are consumed in the raw form found at the farm gate. 
Instead, the raw product progresses through a market channel, which is the sequence of 
markets that commodities pass through as they are transformed from their raw form to 
their consumed form. As described in Moss and Schmitz (2002), each market transaction 
affects the distribution of rents and increases marginal costs beyond those represented by 
the producer’s marginal cost (i.e. supply) curve.  E-Commerce affects each market within 
the marketing channel differently.  
In this study, we analyze the potential effect of I-Commerce on the market 
channel for Florida’s cow-calf production by examining the implications of reduced 
transaction costs associated with Internet livestock auctions.  Cow-calf operators sell their 
cattle at a weight of 400-600 pounds as stocker cattle to backgrounders, who either 
pasture or feed the cattle to a weight of 700-800 pounds. These stocker cattle are then 
marketed as feeder cattle to feedlot operators who fatten these cattle to a finished weight 
of around 1,100 pounds. The fat cattle are then sold to packing plants that butcher the 
cattle and sell the meat for human consumption.  We proceed by presenting a partial 
equilibrium model for these three markets in the vertical channel prior to the introduction 
of Internet auctions for feeder cattle.  We then derive the effects of reduced transaction 
costs, induced by the introduction of Internet auctions for feeder cattle, on all three 
market channels. 
The supply curve facing cow-calf operators at the farm level is PSS  in Figure 1a.  
This supply curve represents the marginal cost of stocker cattle production at all prices 
beyond the point at which cow-calf operators just cover average variable costs.  Adding 
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transaction costs associated with marketing and delivery yields the market-level supply 
curve MSS . The equilibrium quantity of stocker cattle sold by cow-calf operators to 
backgrounders is SQ , for which the backgrounders pay SP  and the cow-calf operator 
receives price FSP . The difference between the market price and the farm-gate price is the 
transaction cost. Transaction costs may take several forms, including direct costs (like 
auction fees) and indirect costs (like reduced prices due to imperfections in the market as 
developed by Williamson 1975, 1979, 1985). 
The supply curve facing backgrounders at the farm level is PFS  (Figure 1b).  This 
supply curve represents the marginal cost of feeder cattle production at all prices beyond 
the point at which backgrounders can just cover average variable costs.  Adding 
transaction costs associated with marketing and delivery yields the market-level supply 
curve MFS . The equilibrium quantity of feeder cattle sold by backgrounders to feedlot 
operators is QF for which feedlots pay PF.  This results from the intersection of the 
demand curve for feeder cattle DF and the market-level supply curve MFS .  The 
backgrounders receive price FFP after the transaction costs are paid. 
The supply curve facing feedlot operators at the farm level is MRS (Figure 1c).  
This supply curve represents the marginal cost of fat cattle production at all prices 
beyond the point at which feedlots can just cover average variable costs.  Adding 
transaction costs associated with marketing and delivery yields the market-level supply 
curve MRS . The equilibrium quantity of fat cattle sold by feedlot operators is QR for which 
packers pay PR.  This results from the intersection of the demand curve for feeder cattle 
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DR and the market-level supply curve MRS .  The feedlots receive price FRP  after the 
transaction costs are paid. 
Three different transaction costs are illustrated in Figure 2. The transaction cost in 
the stocker-cattle market is FS SP P− , the transaction cost in the feeder-cattle market is 
F
F FP P− , and the transaction cost in the fat-cattle market is FR RP P− . These price spreads 
represent the costs of doing business in each market.  They do not represent deadweight 
welfare costs to society. However, any reduction in these transaction costs would 
represent net welfare improvements to society. 
The introduction of internet livestock auctions for feeder-cattle induces a 
reduction in the transaction costs associated with the feeder-cattle market.  The direct 
effect of this reduction in transaction costs is illustrated in Figure 2b.  The market-level 
supply curve for feeder cattle shifts outwards from MFS  to MFS ′ . The equilibrium price 
paid by feedlots for feeder cattle falls from FP to FP′  and the price received by producers 
for feeder cattle increases from FFP to FFP′ . In addition, the quantity of feeder cattle 
consumed increases. Though not explicitly depicted in Figure 2b, the economic rent 
accruing to feeder-cattle producers increases along with the consumer surplus accruing to 
feeder cattle consumers, because the quantity of feeder cattle sold increases and the price 
received for feeder cattle also increases. 
Reduced transaction costs in the feeder-cattle market as a result of Internet 
auctions for feeder cattle have an indirect effect on both the stocker and fat-cattle markets 
(Figures 2a and 2c, respectively). The demand curve for stocker cattle in Figure 2a is a 
derived demand curve for stocker cattle that is based on the supply curve for feeder cattle. 
Using standard production economics results, an increase in the price of an output (feeder 
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cattle) causes an increase in the derived demand for an input (stocker cattle). Hence, the 
reduction in transaction costs in the feeder-cattle market causes an outward shift in the 
demand curve for stocker cattle from SD  to SD′  (Figure 2a). This results in an increase in 
the price paid for stocker cattle (from SP  to SP′ ).  The price received for stocker cattle 
also increases from FSP to FSP′ . 
Reduced transaction costs in the feeder-cattle market as a result of Internet 
auctions for feeder cattle also affect the fat cattle market as depicted in Figure 2c.  The 
supply of fat cattle from producers shifts outward from PRS  to PRS ′ which means that the 
price paid for fat cattle by packers is less for any given quantity. (This shift, like the shift 
in the derived demand curve within the stocker-cattle market, follows directly from 
production economics). The reduction in transaction costs in the feeder-cattle market 
(Figure 2b) implies a reduction in the price of an input used in the production of fat cattle. 
The reduction in the price paid for feeder cattle causes the supply of fat cattle to increase, 
all else being equal. Adding the transaction costs to the new supply relationship, PRS ′ , 
implies an outward shift from MRS to MRS ′ in the marginal cost of producing and marketing 
feeder cattle. This outward shift in supply implies a reduction in the price paid to feedlots 
by packers (from RP to RP′ ). In addition, the price received by feedlots declines (from 
F
RP to FRP′ ). 
The effect of this change in economic rents for cattle feeders is somewhat more 
complicated than is the effect on cow-calf producers and on the producers of stocker 
cattle. Specifically, in the stocker-cattle market of Figure 2a, the economic rents increase 
because the price paid for stocker cattle by backgrounders increases from FSP to FSP′ , and 
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the quantity of stocker cattle sold increases from SQ  to SQ′ . Likewise, the reduction in 
transaction costs causes an increase in the farm-level price of feeder cattle from FFP to 
F
FP′ at an increased quantity (Figure 2b).  However, the price received for sales of fat 
cattle by feedlots (Figure 2c) declines from FRP to FRP′ . In this case, the additional 
economic rents accruing to fat-cattle producers are equal to the increased consumer rents 
under the derived demand curve in the feeder-cattle market, SD′  (Just and Hueth 1979). 
V. Institutional Arrangements in the Marketing of Stocker and Feeder Cattle 
The development of the marketing channel for feeder cattle presented above 
makes reference to the market institutions used to buy and sell feeder cattle in Florida and 
Iowa.  In order to develop the implications of E-Commerce in this market, we discuss 
these marketing arrangements below.  There are four major market mechanisms for the 
sale of stocker and feeder cattle: local livestock auctions, video auctions, Internet 
auctions, and private contracts (sometimes called country sales).  Each mechanism 
implies slightly different terms of delivery, payment guarantees, number of buyers, and 
amount of information provided. 
A.  Local Livestock Auctions 
Traditionally, most stocker and feeder calves marketed in the United States have 
been marketed through local auction houses.  In 2001, there were twelve local cattle 
auctions in the state of Florida (Table 3).   The largest of these livestock auctions is the 
Okeechobee Livestock Market in Okeechobee, Florida, followed by the Arcadia State 
Livestock Market in Arcadia, Florida, and the Sumter Co. Farmer’s Market in Webster, 
Florida.  About 77 percent of the cattle sold through auctions in the state of Florida are 
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stocker and feeder cattle (Table 4).  Historically, roughly half of the stocker and feeder 
cattle in Florida have been sold through local livestock auctions (Table 5). 
Local livestock auctions typically draw cattle from the surrounding area (some 
sales are large enough to draw cattle from more distant regions, such as Amarillo in the 
Texas Panhandle) for sale in an English oral auction on a specified day of the week.  
These auctions may be dominated by a small number of buyers who specialize in 
arbitrage and aggregation.  For example, a buyer may purchase cattle at three local 
auction barns and combine purchases into larger pens for sale at regional markets.  
Several factors determine the price of cattle in these local auctions.  Larger auctions 
(auctions involving more cattle) usually attract more buyers, and hence result in higher 
prices (which is consistent with auction theory).  However, the size of the auction is 
partially determined by the average pen size.  Cattle can be sold individually or in pen 
sizes up to two hundred head or more.  Bailey and Peterson (1991) indicate that buyers 
will pay a higher price for larger, uniform pens of cattle. 
Farms that use local auction houses haul their cattle into the facility for the sale.  
Buyers bid on the cattle based on weight, condition, and other characteristics observed in 
the sale ring.  The highest bid gains title to the cattle at the close of the business day upon 
payment to the auction company.  The seller receives payment from the livestock 
company.  These transactions are governed by the Packers and Stockyards Act. 
B.  Video Auctions 
Video auctions are similar to local livestock auctions in that buyers bid on a pen 
of cattle during a specified time in an interactive oral auction.  Specifically, once a pen of 
cattle is offered for sale at a local auction house or video auction, sequential bids are 
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received until a purchase price is determined (this procedure will be contrasted with a 
catalogue sale, discussed later).  However, the video auction does not involve cattle 
present at the auction house.  Cattle remain “in the country” at the seller’s farm or ranch.  
In a video auction, a video clip represents the quality of the cattle at the time of sale.  At 
the point of sale, the buyer and seller arrange delivery of the cattle.  However, as in the 
local auction arrangement, the buyer and seller interact through a bonded agent. 
The move toward video auctions involves certain nuances regarding market 
structure.  First, video auctions typically involve truck-load lots or pens.  This innovation 
is due to transaction costs implicit in transportation.  A buyer who purchases cattle, and 
takes delivery on the seller’s farm or ranch, will pay more if transportation costs are 
lower.  Transportation costs are lower for truck-load lots.  Thus, video auctions favor 
larger producers who are able to market cattle in uniform truck-load lots. 
A second advantage to be had from video auctions is implicit in the transportation 
costs.  As stated earlier, when a farmer sells cattle in a local auction barn, cattle are 
loaded onto a trailer and transported to the auction house.  After sale, the buyer then loads 
the cattle onto a trailer and brings them home.  At the extreme, assume that the buyer and 
the seller own adjoining farms.  Thus, all the transportation to and from the auction 
facility is wasted cost.  While this scenario represented an exaggerated case, significant 
reductions in transportation expenses can be obtained by moving the cattle only once.  
For example, one implicit transportation cost is “shrink” (or weight loss).  Cattle 
experience shrink when they are loaded and hauled.  Thus, reducing the number of times 
cattle are moved, reduces the shrink.  In addition, bypassing the sale barn may decrease 
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the risk of diseases such as Bovine Respiratory Disease Complex (Nyamusika et. al. 
1994). 
A potential downside to video auctions is that relatively less information on the 
quality or condition of the cattle for sale may be observable in the video clip.  Less 
information would then imply greater uncertainty and, hence, a lower bid price for cattle.   
The structure of the video auction also raises the potential for misrepresentation.  For 
example, the seller may be tempted to video only the best cattle.  This tendency is 
reduced by the repeated nature of cattle sales.  Most producers market cattle every year 
using the same mechanism.  Thus, the seller would have an incentive to appropriately 
represent cattle for sale on the video.  In addition (as discussed by Bailey, Peterson, and 
Brorsen [1991]) the video auction company tapes the video clip that will be used in the 
sale.  Thus, the auction company is legally responsible for the accuracy of the 
representation.  The integrity of the video representation is heavily dependent on the 
auction company’s representative. 
Even though the responsibility of adequate representation falls on the video 
auction company, the repeated-game nature of cattle markets may still have significant 
implications.  Specifically, while visual examination of cattle conveys significant 
information about the current value of the cattle, the full value of the cattle to the feedlot 
operator (or backgrounder) may only be determined after the cattle have been fed to 
finished weights.  This value is largely dependent on the genetics in a given herd (the 
value may also be affected by managerial decisions such as supplemental feeding 
programs for sucking and weaned calves, weather, etc.)  The observation of additional 
quality characteristics during feeding gives rise to the value of reputation in repeated 
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games.  Under this scenario, past buyers of a pen of cattle marketed by a producer 
possess information regarding quality that is not apparent from visual inspection.  If that 
information is positive, then the buyer is willing to pay more for the cattle than an 
uniformed buyer (one who has not previously purchased the producer’s cattle).  This 
higher valuation leads to repeat purchases. 
To understand the additional insight offered by the possibility of reputation within 
the context of the expansion of the number of buyers touted by video auction, consider a 
world in which both buyers and sellers remain anonymous.  In this scenario, sellers do 
not know who buys their cattle, but the video auction company will certify that more 
buyers are present.  Similarly, buyers do not know the seller but value the cattle based on 
visual inspection.  This market structure is sufficient to conclude that sellers will receive 
a higher price for their cattle as the market expands, but we would conjecture that the 
pairings (combinations of buyers and sellers in a given transaction) would not 
systematically repeat over time.  Each sales contract would randomly pair buyers and 
sellers.  Further, we would conjecture that this randomness (say using an entropy measure 
such as the one proposed by Shannon and Weaver [1963]) would increase as the number 
of buyers increased. 
Empirical evidence, however, contradicts the conjecture that the pairings become 
more random.  Specifically, several cattle producers report repeat buyers, even for video 
auctions, as the number of buyers increase.  Thus, the repeated game or reputation 
scenario may be used to explain the persistence of buyer-seller pairings even if the 
number of buyers expands.  The question then becomes:  what is the value of video 
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auctions in the presence of reputation?  Would private pairings dominate video auctions, 
even if video auctions imply more buyers? 
C.  Internet Auctions (I-Commerce) 
The third mechanism for marketing cattle is the use of the Internet or E-
Commerce.  As discussed earlier in this paper, E-Commerce has become the catch-word 
for a broad group of information technologies.  However, business applications of E-
Commerce typically center on the Internet (I-Commerce).  The Internet allows buyers 
and sellers to interact rapidly (depending on the speed of their Internet connections) or at 
one party’s convenience.  This dual nature is apparent in the structure of cattle auctions 
over the Internet.  Cattle auctions on the Internet take two forms.  One form is an 
instantaneous auction based on traditional video auction formats.  These Internet 
applications allow buyers on the Internet to see a video (most Internet auctions currently 
present only pictures of the cattle, not moving video because of bandwidth 
considerations) of the cattle and to bid on those cattle.  The second form is referred to as 
a listing or catalogue sale (some representative catalogue listings are presented in 
Appendix A).  In this format, information, similar to that presented in the interactive 
auction, is posted on the Internet along with terms of delivery.  Buyers can bid on these 
offerings over the course of several days. 
The similarity between Internet cattle auctions and video auctions raises the 
possibility of a unified auction format that allows buyers to participate in person, through 
a video uplink (either at a dedicated video-site or over the phone by viewing cattle on a 
dedicated satellite channel), or over the Internet.  Currently, Superior Livestock Auction 
(Fort Worth, Texas, and Denver, Colorado), used heavily by Florida producers, markets 
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cattle using both video and Internet auctions.  However, Internet auctions have not been 
integrated with video auctions because of the speed of most Internet users connection.  
According to one representative of Superior the Internet feed may be as far as 30 seconds 
behind the sale ring using current technology.  This lag is sufficient to make simultaneous 
participation by Internet bidders, along with those present at the sale ring and video 
facilities, infeasible (Paul Branch, Superior Livestock Auction representative). 
While Internet auctions are similar to video auctions, some auctions have 
developed additional bidding mechanisms such as the proxy bid at Superior Livestock 
Auction.  The proxy bid allows the buyer to specify a maximum price he is willing to pay 
for a given lot.  The computer then raises the current bid by $0.10/cwt until bid wins or 
exceeds the maximum specified proxy bid (this is similar to the approach taken by E-
bay).  Another difference is that on the Internet auction sites, the winning bid must stand 
for 30 seconds to allow for timing considerations over the Internet. 
Internet listing or catalogue sales are similar to the Internet auctions described 
above, expect that the bidding may occur over the course of days or weeks.  In this 
format the information is posted on an internet site along with an asking price.  Bids are 
then accepted, again over the course of several days.  The seller has the prerogative to 
accept a bid below the asking price, or wait for the end of the market period.  If a bidder 
meets the seller’s asking price, the auction is over.  Typically, the listing or catalogue 
venue offers cattle for delivery farther into the future than the video or online auctions do 
(the listing presented in Appendix A offers cattle for delivery up to 45 days into the 
future).  As such, catalogue or listing venues may be viewed as markets for forward 
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contracts.  However, the benefits from these venues are the same as those from the more 
interactive forms of Internet auctions. 
D.  Private Contracts/Country Sales 
The final marketing mechanism considered in this paper is private contact (or 
country sales).  Under this marketing scenario, the buyer or seller directly contacts the 
other side of the sale based on previous knowledge.  The buyer would then make an offer 
for the cattle based on past experience or inspection.  This mechanism has developed into 
private auctions where the seller contacts several sellers on a conference call and solicits 
bids following the English auction format.  Alternatively, some firms have experimented 
with closed Internet auctions using similar formats. 
As discussed previously, these sales may be based on reputation.  If a small set of 
buyers have historically purchased a producer’s cattle through local auctions, video 
auctions, or even over the Internet, this experience could lead to contact sales for at least 
a portion of the producer’s output.  Specifically, the producer could use other marketing 
mechanisms to establish a reputation and then choose to market at least a portion of his 
cattle through private treaty.  The decision to move towards private contacts and away 
from other marketing mechanisms would imply lower direct transaction costs (as will be 
discussed in the next section, each of the auction or listing mechanisms discussed above 
charge a commission).  However, the farmer may simply trade one transaction cost for 
another.  Specifically, while the farmer does not pay the commission charged by the 
livestock market in a private contact sale, he may be subject to the implicit transaction 
cost of impacted information developed within the Williamson framework.  In addition, 
the farmer may face additional risk not explicit in the Williamson model such as 
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collection risk.  Each of the formal marketing channels (local livestock auctions, video 
auctions, and Internet auctions) is covered under the Packers and Stockyard regulations.  
Thus, they are required to post bonds to warrantee payment to the seller.  Such guarantees 
may not exist in private contact sales. 
VI. How Do Producers Market Cattle In Florida? 
In order to get a ballpark estimate of the share of cattle that is sold using each 
marketing mechanism, we surveyed cattle producers in North Florida.  These survey 
results are presented in Table 6.  The number of cattle sold using local auction houses is 
55.26 percent, which is close to the state level estimate of 53.3 percent (Table 5).  Among 
the other mechanisms, the quantity of cattle marketed through video auctions and private 
treaties are roughly equal, but less than 20 percent while the quantity marketed through 
Internet auctions is relatively small (around 7.5 percent).  The greatest disagreement 
among these experts involved the role of video auctions.  One of the experts thought that 
the sales through video auctions could be as high as 31 percent. 
Undoubtedly, many factors explain producers’ choice of marketing channels 
(Table 6).  However, for the purposes of this study, we will focus on distribution of herd 
sizes in the state of Florida, differences in direct transaction costs, and the effect of 
technology. 
A.  Herd Size 
As presented in our discussion of the institutional arrangements above, both video 
auctions and Internet auctions are based on truck-load lots.  Thus, in order to market 
through these mechanisms producers must be able to offer a uniform truck-load pen of 
calves at one time.  In Florida, livestock hauls are limited to 50,000 lbs.  Assuming that a 
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stocker calf weighs 500 lbs, this implies at least 100 calves.  Similarly, if cattle weigh 
600 lbs, the farmer must be able to market 84 head.  Assuming a 90 percent calving 
weight, this implies that the producer must have between 93 and 110 brood cows if both 
steer and heifer calves are marketed together, or 185 to 222 brood cows if the producer 
wants to take advantage of single sex lots (which are typically preferred by feedlots).  
Thus, the question becomes: how many cattle producers in Florida can effectively market 
in truck-load lots? 
Table 7 presents the distribution of the herd size in California, Florida, Iowa, 
Oklahoma and Texas.  This distribution indicates that around 10 percent of the herds in 
the state of Florida probably have a sufficient size to offer truck-load lots.  This result is 
fairly consistent with those of other states.  While this percentage would initially appear 
inconsistent with the frequency of video and Internet auctions presented in Table 6, it 
must be remembered that these larger herds, by definition, have more cattle.  A rough 
estimate of the number of cattle by group (based on the midpoint of each range) indicates 
that this 10 percent in the state of Florida accounts for 61.74 percent of the calves 
marketed.  Hence, it appears that most of the farmers that can offer truck-load lots market 
through either video auctions, the Internet, or private treaty. 
B.  Direct Transaction Costs 
A second factor that explains the adoption of video and Internet auctions is the 
direct transaction costs.  Ocala Livestock Auction in Ocala, Florida charges a commission 
fee of 4 percent for every calf marketed through the sale ring.  Assuming a current market 
price of $80/cwt for a 550 lb steer in Florida, this implies a commission of $17.60.  The 
same manager who operates Ocala Livestock Auction also represents Superior Livestock 
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Auction.  Superior charges $2.00/head for each animal listed in its video sale catalog 
(which is distributed to buyers before each auction).  If the calf is sold (if the price at the 
time of the auction is greater than any reserve price specified by the producer), the 
commission is 2 percent, or $8.80/head.  The listing fee is applied against this 
commission, so the seller only pays the $8.80/head.  On the other hand if the sale price 
does not exceed the reserve price and no sale occurs, the seller forfeits the $2.00/head.  
Cattle marketed by Superior Livestock Auction on its Internet auction pay a commission 
of 1.5 percent if the cattle are sold.  Thus, the fee over the Internet is $6.60/head.  The 
direct transaction costs appear to favor Internet auctions over video auctions, and video 
auctions over local sale barns. 
From this discussion, the prevalence of video and Internet auctions and private 
treaty sales by large producers are apparent.  Large producers can reduce their direct 
transaction costs by offering truck-load lots using either video or Internet auctions.  
Further, the number of cattle available for sale at any time and the value of reputation to 
these producers make the use of private contacts more likely.  The only remaining 
question relates to the relative significance of video and Internet sales.  The forgoing fee 
structure appears to support a move toward Internet sales.  Further, Internet sales do not 
have the same risk associated with the cost of no-sale associated with the video auction 
(the $2.00/head catalogue fee). 
C.  Effect of Internet Technology 
Two common explanations of the dominance of video sales at the current time are 
the comfort level of buyers with the Internet, and bandwidth or speed issues related to 
Internet access, especially in rural areas.  Paul Branch, with Superior Livestock Auction, 
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states the comfort criteria in terms of “the guy with the checkbook.”  If the primary buyer 
is over 55 years old, he may not be comfortable enough with Internet technologies to bid 
on cattle over the Internet.  The television/satellite system used by Superior Livestock 
Auction is more familiar to these producers. 
Questions regarding bandwidth are two-fold.  First, as previously discussed, most 
Internet auctions currently use still pictures of cattle instead of movie clips that can be 
displayed over satellites because of bandwidth issues.  Bandwidth refers (roughly) to the 
number of computer bits that can be moved over the user’s access provider.  Currently 
moving pictures contain too many computer bits to be effectively displayed over all but 
“hard wired” connections (T1/T3/T12) connections.  This limitation is currently being 
reduced on two fronts.  First, the technology for providing Internet access to consumers is 
improving.  Dialup providers are being replaced by DSL, cable modems, and even digital 
satellite connections.  Second, software designers are attempting to reduce the number of 
bits required to display moving images.  In the jargon of the trade, they are improving the 
compression of the image. 
Second, as the bandwidth expands, it may become possible to merge the video 
and Internet auctions into a single market.  As discussed earlier, currently the lag time 
between Internet and bidders on the floor at the actual auction house currently precludes 
participants on the Internet from effectively bidding in the video auction.  However, as 
the access speed to rural communities increases this barrier may become less 
constraining. 
A final point worth considering is the method of payment.  A critical issue in the 
general consumer acceptance of I-Commerce has involved the security of the Internet.  
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Consumers who purchase books, records, etc. over the Internet using credit cards worry 
about having their access numbers stolen.  This concern is minimized by the institutional 
arrangements involved in Internet cattle auctions.  Specifically, the auction houses 
themselves establish lines of credit for registered buyers prior to the auction.  Thus, at the 
time of the auction, the buyer does not have to send financial information over the web.  
In addition, the livestock facilities themselves are bonded according to the Packers and 
Stockyard act. 
D.  I-Commerce and Transaction Costs: A Synthesis 
In general, the current use of I-Commerce to market cattle (strictly defined as 
Internet auctions) is small (around 7.5 percent).  However, the existence of Internet 
auctions as a marketing institution appears fairly similar to video auctions that have 
grown in popularity since their introduction in the late 1980s.  Thus, the future of Internet 
cattle auctions appears to be tied intimately to the video auctions.  Internet auctions and 
video auctions may actually merge through time as the bandwidth and acceptability of the 
Internet increases, particularly in rural communities. 
Empirically it is fairly easy to verify that Internet cattle auctions have lower direct 
transaction costs than either video auctions or local livestock facilities.  However, the 
effect of the Internet (or video auctions) on indirect transaction costs that arise from 
impacted information under Williamson’s framework is far harder to measure (see 
Hobbs, 1997, for a discussion of ways in which to measure these costs for fat cattle 
markets).  Anecdotal information suggests that video auctions do deepen the market.  
Specifically, local livestock auctions in regions experiencing a drought are typically 
depressed as local producers attempt to reduce their herd size.  However, these depressed 
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prices, observed in local markets, typically do not carry through to video auction offering 
from the same area. 
The changing structure of cattle markets raises several concerns; however, the 
greatest concern involves the effect of Internet and video auctions on price discovery.  In 
general, we assume that price discovery works through a Walrassian tatonnement 
process.  The starting point of this tatonnement is some previously observed price (this 
previously observed price may be from the same market, or from another close market 
that trades frequently).  Adoption of Internet and video auctions may weaken price 
discovery by reducing the information on previous prices in local auctions. 
VII. Welfare Impacts of Reduced Transaction Costs in Florida Cattle Marketing 
A.  Demand Specifications 
Empirical estimates of the welfare effects associated with reduced transaction 
costs induced by internet livestock auctions in Florida are calculated using the constant 
elasticity of demand specification of Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986), also employed 
by Schmitz, Schmitz, and Dumas (1997), and Schmitz (2002).  Under this specification, 
the inverse aggregate demand for feeder cattle purchased by feedlots from backgrounders 
in the United States takes the form:  
(1) βα TT qqp =)(  
The parameters for the inverse aggregate demand curve are recovered by specifying an 
initial price (p), initial aggregate quantity sold ( Tq ), and aggregate price elasticity of 
demand (ε) for feeder cattle in the United States.  The price elasticity of aggregate 
demand is computed as: 
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Hence, the demand parameter (β) is recovered through the relationship: 
(3) 
ε
β 1=  
Once β is determined, the second demand parameter (α) is calculated by substituting (3) 
into (1) which yields: 
(4) εα
1
−
= Tpq  
B. Marginal Cost Specification 
In order to incorporate transaction costs into the analysis, we start with the 
approach employed by Schmitz, Schmitz, and Dumas (1997) and subsequently by 
Schmitz (2002).  The backgrounders’ inverse aggregate supply curve for feeder cattle is 
derived from a total cost function that allows the shutdown price for feeder cattle to be 
incorporated into a simple, smooth, functional form.  Empirically, an inverse supply 
curve specified with no shutdown price would be highly unrealistic for feeder cattle 
production given our farm budget information.  Neglecting the shutdown price would 
yield a much larger estimate of producer surplus than what it actually should be.  Under 
this approach, the inverse aggregate supply curve is specified as a “constant elasticity of 
supply”, scaled by incorporating the shutdown price as an intercept term.  Of course, this 
specification no longer has the property of constant elasticity of supply, but is a relatively 
simple functional form that is twice continuously differentiable with a positive first 
derivative and negative second derivative.  
 30
     Under this approach, the inverse aggregate supply curve at the backgrounders’ level 
(the marginal cost curve that does not include the transaction costs associated with 
livestock auctions) is: 
(5) cTTR bqaqp +=)(  
where the parameter (a) is equal to the shutdown price, below which no feeder cattle 
would be sold. 
In order to adapt the above approach to the current analysis, the marginal cost curve 
at the farm (backgrounder) level must be modified to include the transaction cost 
associated with live cattle auctions, and to include the impact of internet auctions.  This is 
because the inverse demand specification (1) is associated with the price paid to 
backgrounders by feedlots whereas the inverse supply specification (5) is associated with 
the final price received by backgrounders, after they pay for the cost of marketing feeder 
cattle through the livestock auction.  The aggregate inverse marginal cost function for 
backgrounders at the buyers’ level (incorporating the cost of the livestock auction) is 
specified as: 
(6) cTT bqawsfqp ++−= )1()( δ  
where f is the fee that is paid by backgrounders (per head) in order to sell their feeder 
cattle at a live cattle auction, δ is the discount or percentage reduction in the price paid 
(per head) when marketing cattle using an internet auction in place of a live auction, w is 
the percentage of cattle that are sold using an internet auction, and s equals one (in the 
case where internet auctions are used in both Florida and the rest of the United States), 
otherwise s equals Florida’s initial share of the U.S. market (in the case where internet 
auctions are used in Florida only). 
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Equation (6) can be rewritten in terms of the aggregate supply elasticity (η) 
through the following procedure.  First, rewrite (6) as: 
(7) 
b
wsfapq cT
)1( δ−−−
=  
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides and solving for ln(qT) yields: 
(8) 




 −−−
=
−
b
wsfapcqT
)1(lnln 1 δ  
Making use of equation (8) and extensive use of the chain rule, the supply elasticity 
becomes: 
(9) ( ) 11 )1(
ln
ln
−
−
−−−=
∂
∂
= wsfappc
p
qT δη  
Once the parameters f, δ, w, s, a, the initial aggregate quantity sold (qT), and the aggregate 
supply elasticity (η) are specified, the parameter (c) in equation (6) can be recovered by 
rewriting (9) as: 
(10) ( ) 11 )1( −− −−−= wsfappc δη  
The final parameter can be recovered by solving for b in equation (6) using the value for 
c in equation (10): 
(11) ( ) cTqwsfapb −−−−−= 1)1( δ  
Once the parameters have been estimated, a counterfactual simulation can be 
performed by specifying different values for w (the percentage of cattle that are sold 
using an internet auction) and s (which depends upon whether internet auctions are 
introduced just in Florida or in the entire U.S.) and solving the following relationships 
simultaneously, to obtain a new equilibrium aggregate quantity ( *Tq ) , which then 
determines the new equilibrium price ( *p ): 
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(12) βα TT qqp =)(  (aggregate demand relationship) 
(13) cTT bqawsfqp ++−= )1()( δ  (aggregate supply relationship) 
We are interested in two cases, the first is the one in which all of the United States 
moves partially towards internet livestock auctions, and the second is the one in which 
just Florida moves partially towards internet livestock auctions.  In the first case, the 
parameter s is set equal to one, and the price received by all producers in the U.S. 
(including Florida) becomes: 
(14) )1(** wfppR δ−−=  
In the second case, the price actually received by backgrounders in the U.S., excluding 
Florida producers, is simply equal to: 
(15)  fppR −= **  
And the price received by Florida producers equals: 
(16) )1(** wfppF δ−−=  
C. Welfare Calculations 
     Welfare measures can be derived for aggregate U.S. demand using the following 
procedure.  By definition, consumer surplus represents the area below the demand curve 
and bounded by the price line.  Mathematically this is written: 
(17) ( )∫ −=
*
)(
q
TT TRdqqPCS
θ
 
where TR is total revenue, *q is the new equilibrium quantity demanded, and θ is a 
number close to zero.i 
Solving and rearranging (17) yields: 
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By definition, producer surplus represents the area below the price line and bounded by 
the supply curve.  Mathematically, aggregate U.S. producer surplus can be written as: 
(19) ( )∫ +−=
*
0
Tq
T
c
TT dqbqaTRPS  
where *Tq  is the new equilibrium aggregate quantity supplied.  Solving (19) and 
rearranging yields: 
(20) 11)1(*)*( +−+−−= cTTRT qcbqapPS  
The producer surplus associated with Florida producers can be calculated as: 
(21) ( )*)*(* FRTTF ppqPSsPS −+=  
Where s is Florida’s market share.  In the case where internet auctions are introduced in 
the entire U.S., the price received by Florida producers is equal to the price received by 
the rest of the U.S., which implies that equation (21) reduces to ( )F TPS s PS= . 
D. Empirical Results 
 Before empirical results can be obtained for the welfare effects associated with 
the introduction of internet livestock auctions in either Florida or the entire U.S., the base 
case must be established, and the supply and demand parameters must be obtained.  For 
the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that under the base case, all feeder cattle are 
marketed through live cattle auctions.  This implies that the parameter (w) is set to zero.  
Aggregate supply and demand elasticities are taken from Marsh (1994) as shown in the 
first two rows of Table 8.  The analysis is performed using Marsh’s short-run, 
intermediate-run, and long-run elasticities.  Following Marsh, the short-run is defined as 
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two-months, the intermediate-run is defined as eighteen months, and the long-run is 
defined as greater than eighteen months.  Based on current market conditions, the average 
weight for feeder cattle at auction is set to 700 pounds/head at an average price of 
$75/cwt.  The total U.S. calf crop is approximately 40.9 million head of cattle, with 
750,000 head sold in Florida.  This implies a value for Florida’s market share of s = 
1.8%.  The average transaction cost associated with marketing feeder cattle at a live 
auction in the U.S is assumed to be f = $17.60/head.  This estimate was obtained by 
surveying managers of livestock auctions in North Florida as described in the previous 
section.  Finally, upon discussion with industry experts, the shutdown price (a) is set at 50 
cents/pound. 
  The results of the welfare analysis associated with partially moving towards internet 
auctions in the entire United States are presented in Table 8.  In order to obtain the values 
in Table 8, it is assumed that w = 40% of the feeder cattle get auctioned through internet 
livestock auctions.  The transaction cost associated with internet auctions is set equal to 
$8.80 as discussed in the previous section.  This results in a value of δ = 50% for the 
reduction in transaction costs associated with marketing cattle through internet auctions 
as opposed to live auctions.  Considering w and δ together, wδ = 20% is the average 
reduction in the transaction fee as shown in the third row of Table 8.   
When U.S. backgrounders partially move towards internet auctions, feedlots pay 
between $2.34 and $1.86 less for feeder cattle and backgrounders receive between $1.18 
and $1.66 more for the cattle they sell (net of the sales cost of the auction) as shown in 
Table 8.  The quantity of feeder cattle marketed increases from between 46,000 to 
402,959 head.  Aggregate producer surplus rises from between $48 and $68 million as a 
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result of the reduced transaction costs associated with internet auctions.  In addition, 
aggregate consumer surplus rises from between $95 and $76 million.  The total welfare 
of the feeder cattle sector in the U.S. rises by $144 million as a result of internet auctions.  
In Florida, the number of feeder cattle sold increases from between 854 and 7,389 head 
as a result of internet auctions.  Producer surplus in Florida rises by between 886,000 and 
1.25 million (Table 8). 
The results of the welfare analysis associated with partially moving towards 
internet auctions in Florida only are presented in Table 9.  In order to obtain the values in 
Table 9, it is assumed that w = 40% of the feeder cattle in Florida get auctioned through 
internet livestock auctions.  However, none of the feeder cattle in the rest of the U.S. are 
sold through internet auctions.  Hence, the average aggregate reduction in the transaction 
fee associated with livestock auctions, is reduced by only δws = .37% for the U.S. as 
shown in Table 9.   
When only Florida backgrounders partially move towards internet auctions, the 
average price paid for cattle in the U.S decreases by less than 5 cents/head and 
backgrounders in the rest of the U.S. receive less than 4 cents/head more for the cattle 
they sell (net of the sales cost of the auction) as shown in Table 9.  The quantity of feeder 
cattle marketed increases by only between 854 and 7,365 head.  Aggregate producer 
surplus rises from between $882,000 and $1.2 million as a result of the reduced 
transaction costs associated with internet auctions.  In addition, aggregate consumer 
surplus rises from between $1.7 and $1.4 million.  The total welfare of the feeder cattle 
sector in the U.S. rises by $2.6 million as a result of internet auctions.   
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The welfare benefits to the U.S on aggregate are very small.  However, almost all 
of the benefits are captured by Florida producers, because they are the only ones that 
switch to internet auctions under this scenario.  As is shown in Table 9, Florida producers 
receive an average of $3.48/head more for feeder cattle (net of the sales cost of the 
auction) as they partially move towards internet auctions.  The producer surplus accruing 
to Florida producers increases by $2.6 million, if 40% of all Florida backgrounders 
market feeder cattle through internet livestock auctions. 
VIII. Implications and Conclusions 
To this point we have not discussed the potential impacts of contract enforcement 
when cattle are marketed either through video or Internet auctions.  Several producers 
have stated that some delivery contracts have not been honored.  In these cases, the 
buyers have forfeited the down payment made at the point of sale.  However, these cases 
typically involve contracts with extended delivery dates and may not be a large part of 
contracts currently traded using video or Internet auctions.   
 We have also not considered the potential of video or Internet auctions to help 
reduce certain types of risk that could be used in place of traditional hedging or options.  
Again, our examination focuses mostly on E-commerce as a marketing tool and not a risk 
management mechanism.  In addition, the results of our analysis suggest that E-
commerce can reduce both direct and indirect transaction costs in the marketing of 
stocker and feeder cattle.  Coase, Williamson, and Grossman and Hart suggest that this 
reduction in transaction costs will decrease the pressure toward vertical integration and 
retained ownership.  However, it is also likely that the same technologies that make E-
commerce possible will also reduce the diseconomies of scope associated with retained 
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ownership.  Hence we cannot conclude at this time whether the Internet will lead to more 
or less retained ownership by stocker and feeder producers.  Currently, 10 percent of the 
stockers and feeders in Florida are retained by producers and custom fed in various states 
throughout the country. 
 Our study concludes that marketing channels are heavily dependent on the 
distribution of herd size.  As long as a significant number of producers are unable to 
market cattle in truck-load lots (partly because of small farm size), there will always be a 
niche for local, public, livestock auctions.  However, Florida’s recent experience suggests 
that there will be far fewer of these auctions, and the regional distribution of these 
auctions may not match the distribution of cattle in the state.  South Florida in particular 
contains several large herds of cattle.  These producers are moving from towards video 
and Internet auctions fairly rapidly, while cattle herds in north Florida are dominated by 
relatively smaller producers who continue to use public livestock auctions. 
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Table 1. Direct Marketing Web sites for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables a 
Business Name Web site 
(1) Apples 
ApplesOnline.com www.applesonline.com 
Applesource.com www.applesource.com 
Walla Walla Valley Orchards www.brownsbest.com 
(2) Cherries 
Amon Orchards www.amonorchards.com 
Benjamin Twiggs www.benjamintwiggs.com 
Cherry Republic www.cherryrepublic.com 
Riverview Orchard www.rivervieworchard.com 
(3) Citrus 
AllCitrus.com www.florida-fruit.com 
AW/Crisafulli Groves www.awcrisafulliegroves.com 
New River Groves www.florida-oranges.com 
Citrus Country Groves www.citruscounty.com 
Citrus.com www.citrus.com 
Conoley Citrus Packers, Inc. www.conoleycitrus.com 
Florida Citrus Ranch www.citrusranch.com 
Florida Citrus Stand www.flcitrusstand.com 
Indian River Gift Fruit www.giftfruit.com 
Orange Blossom Indian River Citrus www.orange-blossom.com 
Palm Beach Grove & Marketplace www.pbgroves.com 
(4) Cranberries 
New England Country Cupboard www.xmission.com/~arts/necc/neccmain.html
(5) Dates 
Imperial Date Gardens, Inc. www.nvo.com/imperialdat 
(6) Olives 
Olive House www.olivehouse.com 
Olive Merchant & Company www.olivemerchant.com 
Santa Barbara Olive Co. www.sbolive.com 
(7) General Produce 
Puterbaugh Farms www.hopsdirect.com 
Roth Produce Co. www.rothproduce.com 
aSource: Authors’ search on www.yahoo.com 
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Table 2. B2B Sites for I-Commerce in Agriculture a 
Business Name Web site 
Video and Internet Livestock Auctions 
 
Cuero Livestock Commission www.cuerols.com 
CyberStockyard www.cyberstockyard.com 
Turner County Stockyard, Inc. www.turnercountystockyard.com 
Winter Livestock Cattle Auctions www.winterlivestock.com 
CattleinfoNet www.cattleinfonett.com 
Online Livestock Auctions www.onlinelivestockauctions.com 
Stockyards Online, Inc. www.stockyardsonline.com 
Digital Cattle www.digitalcattle.com 
Intermountain West Livestock www.cattleforsale.com 
Kinsey Auction Company www.kinseyauction.com 
Okeechobee Livestock Market www.floridacattle.com 
Producers Video Auction www.producersvideoauction.com 
Western Video Market www.wvmcattle.com 
Billings Livestock Comm. Co. www.billingslivestock.com 
Producers Livestock Marketing www.producerslivestock.com 
Turner County Stockyard, Inc. www.turnercountystockyard.com 
Farm Equipment 
Agrimart www.agrimart.ca 
Ag Dealer Auctions www.agdealerauctions.com 
Machinery Link www.machinerylink.com 
Farms.com www.farms.com 
aSource: Result of multiple searches by the various authors. 
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Table 3. Livestock Markets and Relative Volumes in Florida 
Cattle Sold in 
First Week of 
January 
Livestock Auction City 2001 2000 
Percent of 
Sale in 
Feeder Steers 
and Heifers
Arcadia State Livestock Market Arcadia 1595 1748 81 
Cattleman's Livestock Market Tampa 400  37 
Cattlemen's Livestock Auction Lakeland 300 456 37 
Chipley Livestock Chipley    
Columbia Livestock Auction Lake City 509 599 82 
Hardee Livestock Market Wauchula 556 736 87 
North Florida Farmer's Livestock Market Ellisville 824 842 58 
Ocala Livestock Auction Ocala 609 834 66 
Okeechobee Livestock Market Okeechobee 1921  67 
Sumter Co. Livestock Market Webster 1280  63 
Tindel Livestock Auction Graceville    
Townsend Livestock Auction Madison 354  54 
Source:  The market listing was taken from Florida Agricultural Statistics Livestock, 
Diary, and Poultry Summary, 2000.  The volumes and USDA/AMS website for 
Orlando, Florida http://www.ams.usda.gov/lsg/mncs/ls_orl.htm. 
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Table 4.  Percent of Cattle Marketed Through Auctions During the First 
Week in January 
Categories of Cattle 2001 2000 
Slaughter cows 20 15 
Slaughter bulls 4 3 
Feeders under 600 lbs 71 77 
      Steers 53 58 
      Heifers 47 42 
Feeders over 600 lbs 2 2 
Replacement cows 3 3 
Source: USDA-FL Dept of Ag Market News, Florida Cattle Auctions 
Weekly Summary Fri Jan 11, 2001 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/OR_LS145.txt 
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Table 5. Cattle Sold through an Auction in Florida 
 
Cattle Sold Through 
Auctions 
All Cattle 
Marketed 
Percent of Cattle 
Sold through 
Auctions 
 All Cattle Calves All Cattle Calves All Cattle Calves 
1991 556 389 933 733 59.6 53.1 
1992 594 428 980 760 60.6 56.3 
1993 612 423 990 770 61.8 54.9 
1994 599 383 1,014 786 59.1 48.7 
1995 576 362 1,057 815 54.5 44.4 
1996 546 323 1,023 783 53.4 41.3 
1997 614 358 1,042 781 58.9 45.8 
1998 565 327 1,017 766 55.6 42.7 
1999 584 362 962 721 60.7 50.2 
2000 576 379 982 711 58.7 53.3 
Source:  Florida Agricultural Statistics Livestock, Diary, and Poultry 
Summary, 2000 
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Table 6. Percent of Cattle Sold by Each 
Marketing Mechanism (Expert Survey)
 Average 
Standard 
Deviation
Local Auctions 55.26 7.66 
Video Auctions 19.75 8.25 
Internet Auctions 7.34 2.16 
Private Treaty 17.65 3.02 
 Source: Authors’ interviews with Florida cattle ranchers. 
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Table 7. Distribution of Herd Size by State 
Number of 
Farms California Florida Iowa Oklahoma Texas 
1-49 11100 13500 19700 38500 104000 
50-99 1000 1700 5000 7200 17000 
100-499 1800 1500 2250 4100 11100 
500+ 300 300 50 200 900 
      
Total 14200 17000 27000 50000 133000 
      
1-49 78.17 79.41 72.96 77.00 78.20 
50-99 7.04 10.00 18.52 14.40 12.78 
100-499 12.68 8.82 8.33 8.20 8.35 
500+ 2.11 1.76 0.19 0.40 0.68 
      
100+ 14.79 10.58 8.52 8.60 9.03 
Source: Florida Agricultural Statistical Service Livestock Diary, 
and Poultry Summary 2000. 
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Table 8: Welfare Impacts from Livestock Internet Auctions in the United States 
               Changes from Base Case 
    
 Short-Run Intermediate-Run Long-Run 
  United States  
    
Demand Elasticity -0.255 -0.887 -2.76
Supply Elasticity 0.508 1.167 3.12
Avg. Reduction in Transaction Fee 20% 20% 20%
Price Paid ($/head) -$2.34 -$1.99 -$1.86
Price Received ($/head) $1.18 $1.53 $1.66
Quantity (Head) 46,594 138,291 402,959
Revenue (1000 $) 72,004 132,789 272,958
Producer Surplus (1000 $) 48,334 62,515 68,163
Consumer Surplus (1000 $) 95,716 81,697 76,514
Total Welfare (1000 $) 144,050 144,211 144,676
    
  Florida  
    
Reduction in Transaction Fee 20% 20% 20%
Price Paid ($/head) -$2.34 -$1.99 -$1.86
Price Received ($/head) $1.18 $1.53 $1.66
Quantity (Head) 854 2,536 7,389
Revenue (1000 $) 1,320 2,435 5,005
Producer Surplus (1000 $) 886 1,146 1,250
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Table 9: Welfare Impacts from Livestock Internet Auctions in Florida Only 
               Changes from Base Case 
    
 Short-Run Intermediate-Run Long-Run 
    
  United States  
    
Demand Elasticity -0.255 -0.887 -2.76
Supply Elasticity 0.508 1.167 3.12
Avg. Reduction in Transaction Fee 0.37% 0.37% 0.37%
Price Paid ($/head) -$0.04 -$0.04 -$0.03
Price Received ($/head) $0.02 $0.03 $0.03
Quantity (Head) 854 2,534 7,365
Revenue (1000 $) 1,316 2,426 4,976
Producer Surplus (1000 $) 882 1,140 1,239
Consumer Surplus (1000 $) 1,758 1,500 1,401
Total Welfare (1000 $) 2,640 2,640 2,640
    
  Florida  
Reduction in Transaction Fee 20% 20% 20%
Price Paid ($/head) -$0.04 -$0.04 -$0.03
Price Received ($/head) $3.48 $3.48 $3.49
Quantity (Head) 16 46 135
Revenue (1000 $) 2,616 2,636 2,683
Producer Surplus (1000 $) 2,608 2,613 2,615
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Figure 1. Market channels for cattle  
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Figure 2. Effect of a reduction in transaction costs in feeder market 
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Appendix A. Internet Cattle Listings December 18, 2001 
Internet Auction 
Company 
Numbers Weight Location Delivery Asking Price Bid 
DigitalCattle.com 450 Replacement 
Heifers 
575 lbs. Idaho Fall, ID 1/10/02-1/15/02 100.00 - 
DigitalCattle.com 50 Weaned Steers, 
35 Weaned Heifers 
625/560 lbs. Pingree, ID Immediate 86.00 - 
DigitalCattle.com 114 Weaned 
Seers/Heifers 
500 lbs. Forsyth, MT Immediate 102.00 - 
DigitalCattle.com 42 Weaned Steers, 
42 Weaned Heifers 
525/500 lbs. Jackson, MT Immediate 95.00 - 
Producers Video Auction 113 Steers and 
Heifers 
435/425 lbs. Okeechobee, FL 12/14/01-12/21/01 98.00 - 
Producers Video Auction 57 Steers, 59 Heifers 425/410 lbs. Florida 12/12/01-12/18/01 96.50 - 
Producers Video Auction 72 Steers and Heifers 675/650 lbs. Florida 12/17/01-12/22/01 77.75 - 
Producers Video Auction 65 Weaned Steers 735 lbs. Florida 12/17/01-12/22/01 77.75 - 
Producers Video Auction 69 Hiefers 700 lbs. Florida 12/17/01-12/22/01 73.50 - 
Producers Video Auction 85 Steers 485 lbs. East Texas 12/17/01-12/28/01 102.00 - 
Producers Video Auction 55 Heifer Calves 415 lbs. East Texas 12/17/01-12/28/01 102.50 - 
Producers Video Auction 80 Steer Calves 610 lbs. Texas 12/17/01-12/22/01 86.25 - 
Producers Video Auction 85 Heifer Calves 570 lbs. Texas 12/15/01-12/20/01 84.75 - 
Producers Video Auction 34 Steers, 41 Hiefers 625/600 lbs. Texas 12/15/01-12/20/01 84.75 - 
Producers Video Auction 70 Steer Calves 660 lbs. East Texas 12/17/01-12/31/01 81.25 - 
Producers Video Auction 70 Heifer Calves 650 lbs. Southwest Arkansas 1/05/02-1/15/02 78.00 - 
Winters Cattle Auction 210 Feeder Heifers 675 lbs. Dodge City, KS 1/25/02-2/10/02 86.00 80.00
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Appendix A. Internet Cattle Listings December 18, 2001 (Continued) 
Internet Auction 
Company 
Numbers Weight Location Delivery Asking Price Bid 
Winters Cattle Auction 420 Feeder Heifers 700 lbs. Jetmore, KS 2/15/02-3/05/02 85.00 79.00
Winters Cattle Auction 79 Steers 800 lbs. Mullinville, KS 12/06/01-12/11/01 87.00 84.50
Winters Cattle Auction 100 Steers 740 lbs Richfield, KS 1/11/02-1/20/02 93.00 87.00
Winters Cattle Auction 80 Feeder Heifers 680 lbs. Liberal, KS 1/11/02-1/20/02 87.00 81.00
Winters Cattle Auction 85 Feeder Steers 745 lbs. Richfield, KS 1/31/02-2/14/02 93.00 87.00
Winters Cattle Auction 87 Feeder Heifers 700 lbs. Richfield, KS 1/31/02-2/14/02 87.00 80.00
Winters Cattle Auction 280 Feeder Heifers 750 lbs. Dodge City, KS 12/26/01-1/10/02 86.00 79.00
Winters Cattle Auction 68 Feeder Steers 775 lbs. Dodge City, KS 12/26/01-1/10/02 89.00 83.50
Winters Cattle Auction 150 Feeder Heifers 690 lbs. Garden City, KS 12/10/01-12/20/01 85.00 80.00
Winters Cattle Auction 70 Steers 725 lbs. Bismark, ND 1/1/02-1/15/02 90.00 83.50
Winters Cattle Auction 40 Steers 750 lbs. Garrison, ND 1/25/02-2/5/02 88.00 82.00
Winters Cattle Auction 70 Steers 750 lbs. Garrison, ND 1/25/02-2/5/02 88.00 82.00
Winters Cattle Auction 70 Steers 750 lbs. Garrison, ND 1/25/02-2/5/02 88.00 80.00
Winters Cattle Auction 140 Heifers 625 lbs. Napoleon, ND 12/10/01-12/30/01 62.00 55.00
Winters Cattle Auction 130 Feeder Heifers 675 lbs. Pierceville, KS 2/28/02-3/14/02 84.00 80.00
Winters Cattle Auction 80 Steers 70 Heifers 575 lbs. Almont, ND 10/29/01-11/09/01 96.00 96.00
Winters Cattle Auction 100 Steers 530 lbs Hesperus, CO 10/5/01-10/25/01 105.00 - 
Winters Cattle Auction 63 Feeder Heifers 710 lbs. Wilmore, KS 10/20/01-10/27/01 87.00 87.00
Winters Cattle Auction 57 Steers 825 lbs. Greensburg, KS 3/1/02-3/15/02 90.00 81.00
Winters Cattle Auction 57 Steers 825 lbs. Greensburg, KS 12/10/01-12/20/01 91.00 82.00
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Appendix A. Internet Cattle Listings December 18, 2001 (Continued) 
Internet Auction 
Company 
Numbers Weight Location Delivery Asking Price Bid 
Winters Cattle Auction 57 Steers 825 lbs. Greensburg, KS 1/10/02-1/20/02 90.00 82.00
Winters Cattle Auction 57 Heifers 775 lbs. Greensburg, KS 3/1/02-3/15/02 86.00 77.00
Winters Cattle Auction 57 Heifers 775 lbs. Greensburg, KS 2/10/02-2/20-02 86.00 76.00
Winters Cattle Auction 57 Heifers 800 lbs. Greensburg, KS 1/10/02-1/20/02 86.00 76.00
Winters Cattle Auction 110 Heifers 475 lbs. Dodge City, KS 11/8/01-11/23/01 95.00 95.00
Winters Cattle Auction 105 Steers/Heifers 450 lbs. Okmulgee, OK 10/20/01-10/30/01 118.00 105.25
Winters Cattle Auction 100 Steers 500 lbs. LaJunta, CO 11/1/01-11/17/01 105.00 105.00
Winters Cattle Auction 96 Steers 550 lbs. McClusky, ND 11/1/01-11/17/01 96.25 96.25
Winters Cattle Auction 125 Heifers 675 lbs. Pierceville, KS 1/28/02-2/8/02 85.00 79.50
Winters Cattle Auction 50 Heifers 485 lbs. Aztec, NM 11/1/01-11/15/01 99.00 85.00
WVMCattle.com 27 Weaned Steers, 
58 Weaned Heifers 
560/525 lbs. Elko, NV 12/05/01-12/10/01 95.00 - 
WVMCattle.com 45 Weaned Steers, 
40 Weaned Heifers 
610/570 lbs. Reno, NV 12/05/01-12/07/01 90.00 - 
WVMCattle.com 63 Steers 770 lbs. Reno, NV 12/10/01-12/15/01 85.00 - 
WVMCattle.com 59 Steers 825 lbs. McArthur, CA 12/15/01-12/20/01 82.50 - 
 
                                                 
i It is not possible to directly calculate consumer surplus under specification (1) because it involves dividing by zero.  However, it is 
possible to compute changes in consumer surplus as long as θ is the same in both calculations. 
